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ABSTRACT
One issue in the debate on the welfare-state is whether state-care renders society more livable 
or not. The positive view is that people flourish in the welfare-state, the negative view is that 
people thrive better without. This article approaches the dispute empirically, by comparing 
livability of nations that differ in state-welfare-effort.  
 The livability of nations is measured by the degree to which its citizens live long and happily. 
State-welfare-effect is measured by the scope of welfare-laws and the size of state-wel-
fare-expenditures. Data on average appreciation-of-life around 1980 are available for 28 
nations; mostly rich ones. Appreciation-of-life appears somewhat greater in the nations that 
provide most state-welfare. However, that difference is entirely due to parallel differences in 
economic affluence. Data on change in life-satisfaction between 1950 and 1980 are available 
for only 10 nations, all rich ones. Life-satisfaction did not increase more in the nations where 
state-welfare expanded most. 
 Data on length-of-life in 1980 are available for 97 nations, of which 28 rich ones. 
Life-expectancy appears to be greater in the nations that provide most state-welfare, but again 
the difference disappears when income per head is controlled. Data on change in 
life-expectancy 1965--1985 are available for 35 nations. Gains in life-expectancy appear not 
greater in the nations were state-welfare expanded most. 
 It is concluded that state involvement in welfare provision does not create a more livable 
society. Apparently, non-state welfare works out equally well in present day conditions. 
 
 
1         INTRODUCTION 
The welfare state has been under debate since it emerged. The debate intensified during the last 
decade, when a slowdown in economic growth forced cuts in government expenditures. The 
focus of the discussion is on technical issues, such as how much government expenditures the 
market-economy can pay and whether state-welfareservices can be produced more efficiently. 
On the background there is also a more fundamental discussion on the desirability of the 
welfare-state as such. There are several issues in that discussion:  
 One point of controversy is whether welfare-states really succeed in creating more equality, or 
rather conceal existing cleavages and create new ones.  
 Another issue is whether the welfare-state brings out the best in people, or rather impairs 
initiative and solidarity in the long run. This point links up with the question about freedom in 
  
 
 
the welfare-state. Doesn't state-care make citizens irresponsible and dependent, and won't that 
foster a tendency of Father-State to develop into a Big-Brother?  
 A third point of debate is whether state corporations are efficient producers of welfare 
services. It is argued that state-monopoly and -bureaucracy provide poor products.  
Much of these discussions lead to the question whether the welfare-state makes society more 
`livable' or not. This article focuses on that latter issue. 
 
1.1          Claimed Livability of the Welfare-State 
Opinions differ widely on this matter.1 Roughly there are two points of view. 
 
The positive view: The welfare-state is a superb social invention that provides a better quality of 
life to more people than any society did ever before. The welfare-state not only banned poverty, 
but realized an unprecedented standard of living for the masses. It greatly reduces the pain of 
social inequality and protects the citizens effectively against the whims of capitalistic market 
economy. By granting basic needs for subsistence, security and respect, the welfare-state frees 
the way for the gratification of higher needs that yield more satisfaction. As a result people live 
well in welfare-states. Curtailment on state-welfare will make life harsh and uncertain again. The 
less the state concerns itself with the welfare of citizens, the less habitable society will be. In 
modern individualized society, the welfare-state is in fact an indispensable institution. 
 
The negative view: State-care from the cradle to the grave may seem comfortable, but is not 
really satisfying. It makes people dependent and thereby frustrates basic needs for autonomy, 
challenge and selfrespect. 
Clients of the welfare state are confronted with an alienating bureaucracy and get stuck in 
poverty traps. Unintended undermining of family and church creates moral disruption and 
weakens intimate support. In the long run welfare-states not even guarantee a decent income for 
everybody, because it ruins the economy. This all makes citizens basically insecure and lonely.  
Other institutions than the state can produce better services for the same money with less 
negative side-effects. Hence cuts on state-welfare will not really hurt; at least not in the long run. 
The more the state meddles in citizens lives, the less livable society will become.  
 
1.2        Check on Livability 
Rather than theorize about possible costs and benefits of state-welfare, we can try to decide the 
discussion empirically. We can do so by comparing the livability of nations that differ in 
state-welfare-effort. What is then `livability'?  
 The concept of livability refers to the degree to which provisions and requirements of a 
society fit with the needs and capacities of its members. A society is unlivable if it fails to gratify 
basic human needs. A society is also unlivable if it demands the impossible. See Veenhoven 
(1993) for a more detailed discussion of the concept. 
 Livability as such cannot be measured. We can hardly observe all individual `needs' and 
`capacities', and certainly not their `fit' with societal `provisions' and `requirements'. However, 
we can estimate the livability of nations indirectly. There are two approaches: 1) estimation on 
the basis of living conditions in the nation and 2) estimation on the basis of thriving of the 
citizens. 
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that are deemed likely to fit with the needs and capacities of most citizens. Such conditions are 
typically: high economic development, effective protection of human rights, political democracy, 
good health care and education for everybody. Sometimes, an active welfare-state is also 
mentioned in this context. In this approach, livability is measured by the quality of societal 
provisions. In other words: by societal `input'. 
 There are two problems with this approach. One problem is in the assumption that these 
conditions suit human nature; most of its existence humanity has done without. A second 
problem is the assumption that more of these conditions denote better livability. Even if one 
accepts that humans thrive well in affluence and democracy, it is still questionable whether more 
of this makes them thrive better. 
To underscore the speculative character of this approach we refer to it as `presumed livability'. 
 
Apparent livability An other way to estimate livability of a country is to assess how well people 
flourish in it. The focus is then on societal `output'. In this view, a society where people pine 
away cannot be livable, even if its living-conditions are presumed to be good. Human thriving 
can be assessed in two ways. Like other biological organisms, it manifests in the first place in 
good health and ultimately in the length of life. Because humans are conscious beings, it also 
displays in their appreciation of life. If citizens in a country are happy, that country must be 
reasonable livable. Together these criteria merge in the situation fairy tales end in: a long and 
happy life. We refer to this estimate of livability as `apparent' livability. 
 
Choice for 'apparent'livability In the present discussion about the merits of the welfare-state, the 
conception of `presumed' livability is problematic.  
 One problem is that a high degree of state-welfare is often among the conditions deemed 
required for a good life. For example, state-welfare is one of the seven criteria in Naroll's (1982) 
`Quality of Life Index' (operationalisation of his `Brotherhood' criterion). This leads into 
tautology.  
 Even if we remove state-welfare from the list of beneficial living-conditions, there is still 
some tautology in the use of conceptions of presumed livability in this debate. The question that 
remains is then whether state-welfare is conducive to other conditions deemed desirable, such as 
economic growth, social equality and respect for human rights. For some conditions that is 
almost implied. Rather evidently, welfare-states provide more social equality, because their main 
activity is redistribution. If one considers income-security as a human right, welfare-states are by 
implication quite livable as well, because they guarantee every citizen a minimum income.  
 A further problem is that this approach does not enable an overall judgement. It leads into 
appraisals of specific effects of state-welfare, but does not embody a way to assess the total of 
effects. Suppose that we could establish that state-welfare is slightly detrimental to economic 
growth (in some conditions, at some levels), but that is tends to produce more social equality of 
various kinds. Such observations would not allow a conclusion about the livability of the 
welfare-state, because it is not established that economic growth is more crucial than social 
equality. If no clear value priorities are established, conclusions about more or less livability are 
possible only if all effects are in the same direction; e.g., if state-welfare works out positively on 
everything deemed beneficial. This is typically not the case. The very problem in the discussion 
of the welfare-state is to strike the balance of its contradictory effects. In fact, speaking of 
livability in the sense of `presumed' livability does not clarify the discussion. It rather obscures 
the issue by suggesting a common criterion that does not exist. 
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 For these reasons we opt for considering `apparent' livability; in other words, how healthy and 
happy people are in a country. 
 
 
 
1.3      Research questions 
The empirical question is then whether inhabitants of welfare-states tend to be healthier and 
happier than inhabitants of otherwise comparable countries that provide less state-welfare. 
 To answer that question we will first compare across nations that differ in amount of 
state-welfare effort and inspect whether these nations differ systematically in physical health and 
subjective enjoyment of life. 
 As a second step we will compare through time to assess whether health and happiness 
increased more in the countries where the welfare-state expanded most.  
 Possible correlations between state-welfare-effort and livability can be spurious. 
Welfare-states are typically economically developed nations. Economic prosperity could affect 
livability more than state-welfare as such. Therefore we will try to isolate the effect of 
state-welfare alone. 
 
 
 
2.        METHOD 
The answering of these questions requires that we have valid indicators of both livability of 
nations, and state-welfare-effort in these nations. Another requirement is that we have adequate 
measures for the control variable: economic affluence. 
 
2.1       Indicators of Livability 
As noted above, livability of the nation can best be measured by its `output' in health and 
happiness of its citizens. A country where people are disease ridden and unhappy is apparently 
not well livable. 
 
2.1.1   Length-of-life 
The degree to which inhabitants of a country are physically healthy can be measured in different 
ways: 1) by the incidence of health defects; 2) by health feelings; and 3) by longevity. 
 Prevalence and seriousness of disease in a country can be assessed by doctors (screening) or 
by questioning a representative sample (health survey). Symptom scores are typically summed in 
a health index. There are several problems with this approach. One problem is that the selection 
of symptoms is rather arbitrary and that it is difficult to assign weights. For example, should 
colds be included, and how much worse is pneumonia? Another problem is that incidence of 
disease can be low in a country, because people die young as a result of their first serious illness. 
That situation is not a hallmark of livability. A more practical problem with this approach is that 
there are as yet no comparable data on this matter in a sizable number of countries. 
 Another way is to consider signs of overall health. A subjective approach is to sample how 
healthy people feel they are. This is mostly done by means of survey questions on `satisfaction 
with health'. This method also labors the problem that high survival rates may depress average 
satisfaction. Moreover, the comparability of satisfaction-ratings could be reduced by cultural 
differences in acceptance of health defects. A practical problem is again that data on subjective 
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health are only available for developed nations. 
 Overall objective health can be measured by life-expectancy in the country; good health tends 
to manifest in a long life. The link is not perfect however; heavy investments in health care can 
result is long life in spite of not so good health. As such this indicator may be in the advantage of 
welfare-states. Data about life-expectancy in nations are of good quality, and available for many 
nations at different point in time. Though not ideal this is the best indicator of average health we 
have. 
 
2.1.2      Appreciation-of-life 
The degree to which citizens in a country enjoy life is usually measured by incidence of 
manifestations of the contrary, such as depression and suicide. Major weaknesses of this 
approach are that incidence of extreme dissatisfaction does not bear much information about 
average satisfaction. Dissatisfaction with life does not necessarily lead into depressive disease or 
suicidal behavior. Further, suicide is likely to be higher in societies that do not taboo 
self-termination of life, but are for that reason not less livable. 
 Another approach is asking people how they feel about life. This is common practice in so 
called `Quality-of-life surveys'. Two types of questions are being used. Firstly, questions about 
satisfaction with specific aspects of life, such as perceived adequacy of ones income, fear for 
crime and thrust in government. Such items typically concern domains of life on which 
welfare-states are active, such studies being typically instigated by the state. Use of such items 
would therefore tilt comparison to their favor. As in the case of specific health aspects, there is 
again the problem of constructing an overall index. Not only is this not well feasible, there are 
neither sufficient comparable data. 
 An alternative is questioning about it overall appreciation of life-as-a-whole. This commonly 
referred to as `life-satisfaction' or `happiness'. There are serious doubts about this approach as 
well. 
 
Firstly, there is reluctance to believe that simple survey questions about happiness yield 
meaningful and honest answers. A lot of difficulties have been raised. People would have no 
opinion, questions would be interpreted quite differently and answers would be biased by social 
desirability and ego-defense. Elsewhere Veenhoven (1984, chapter 3) has checked these 
objections empirically, but found little or no support. Though not very precise, answers seem 
reasonably valid. Lack of precision at the individual level is no problem for comparison at the 
nation level; measuring faults 
cancel out in the country-average. 
 Secondly, there are objections against the comparison of satisfaction reports across nations. 
Claims have been made that responses are differently biased in distinct nations, due to cultural 
variation in language, response tendencies, moral appreciation of happiness and familiarity with 
the concept. These possible distortions have been checked empirically as well (Ouweneel and 
Veenhoven, 1990; Veenhoven 1986, 1993). Again no evidence for any serious bias was found. 
On the other hand validity tests were positive. A test for congruent validity showed sizable 
correlations with other indicators of apparent quality-of-life; with incidence of mental distress as 
well as life-expectancy. A test for concurrent validity showed that average life-satisfaction tends 
to be highest in nations that are economically most affluent, politically most democratic, socially 
most equal and that provide best access to knowledge. Together these nation characteristics 
explain 77% of the differences in happiness! (Veenhoven, Edition Sigma, Berlin) 
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 Thirdly, it is claimed that life-satisfaction depends on social comparison within nations, and 
can therefore not be used for estimating variation in livability across nations. This relativist claim 
does not stand empirical tests either (Veenhoven 1991, 1995). 
 
Comparable data on average appreciation-of-life around 1980 are now avaiable for 28 nations. 
There are data about responses to questions about `happiness' as well as data on responses to 
equivalent items on `life-satisfaction'. For several nations time-series are available, covering one 
to four decades (Veenhoven 1993: tables 1.1.1 and 1.2.1). 
 
Congruent validity 
These indicators of livability seem to reflect a similar phenomenon indeed. Average 
appreciation-of-life and length-of-life go together; inter-correlations in our 28 nations data-set 
are: +0.47 (happiness by life-expectancy) and +0.69 (life-satisfaction by life-expectancy). 
oth indicators of livability are also correlated with a third one: prevalence of mental distress 
(r = -0.76, respectively -0.60). 
 
 
 2.2        Indicators of State-Welfare-Effort 
The degree to which nations are welfare-states can be measured in two ways: 1) by the rights for 
welfare services guaranteed in laws; and 2) by the amount of money actually spend on welfare. 
These indices are referred to as `legal' and `financial' indicators. 
 
2.2.1      Legal indicators 
As states operate mostly on the basis of laws, taking stock of welfare legislation allows an 
estimation of welfare-effort. Two methods have been used. 
 Estes (1984) measured state-welfare-effort by the seniority of the welfare system, as measured 
by the year of adoption of its first laws. Laws on five welfare services are considered: pensions, 
sickness, health care, unemployment and family allowances. It is assumed that welfare services 
tend to expand over time. Early beginners would therefore tend to provide most rights nowadays. 
Though there is some truth in that, there are also examples of the contrary. For instance, Sweden 
was a laggard in welfare-state development, but is now the world's most benevolent 
welfare-state. On the other hand Britain was a pioneer in state-welfare, but is now in the middle. 
Data on system seniority are available for a sizable number of nations; rich nations as well as 
poor nations. 
 The other way is to sum welfare entitlements, by making an inventory of current 
welfare-rights in nations and consider their scope. An example of this approach is 
Esping-Andersen's (1990) `Decommodification score'. This indicator reflects a) the range of 
legal entitlements; b) the level of income replacements involved; and c) access to benefits. Four 
welfare services are considered: old age pensions and insurance for sickness, permanent 
disability and unemployment. A problem with this approach is that the package of welfare 
services is not identical in all welfare states. So this indicator compares only to what extend 
welfare states provide more or less of the same, but does not grasp unique services and package 
composition. Comparable data on state-welfare entitlement are current available for rich nations 
only. 
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2.2.2     Financial indicators 
Another possibility is to compare the amount of money states spend on welfare. Expenditures 
can be estimated in two ways; either by adding the costs of all separate welfare-services, or by 
departing from global government expenditures and subtracting non-welfare entries. 
 Indicators of the former kind commonly cover major welfare-categories, such as `health-care', 
`housing' and `social security'. One problem with this method is that these categories are not 
identically defined in national accounts. Another problem is distinguishing between public and 
private welfare services. International agencies have tried to homogenize the data on it 
social-security expenditures. OECD, ILO and IMF provide estimates based on slightly different 
sources and definitions. All three these indicators will be used here.  
 A common drawback of these indicators is that welfare expenditures depend not only on 
generosity of the welfare system, but also on external conditions. For instance, unemployment 
benefits may be meager in a country, but the total expenditures are nevertheless high because of 
mass unemployment. Likewise, expenditures for old age pensions depend heavily on the age 
composition of the population. Data on welfare expenditures are available for a lot of nations. 
The ILO estimates cover most countries and allow comparison trough time for a considerable 
number of nations. 
 There are several ways to estimate state-welfare-effort by means of total it government 
expenditures. The first and most global one is to add all expenditures, assuming that the biggest 
spenders tend to be the most beneficial welfare providers. A variant of that approach is to 
consider only expenditures for government services and salaries, called `government final 
consumption'. High expenditure on that matter is indicative for an active state that is likely to be 
much involved in welfare provision. Other estimates of this kind try to eliminate entries that do 
not concern welfare. One can leave out capital expenditures and focus on `disbursements'. A 
major problem with this approach is that government expenditures involve more than welfare 
expenditures. In fact it measures global state activity rather than specific welfare-state-activity. 
For the sake of completeness we will nevertheless consider these indicators as well. As none of 
them stands out as the best, all will be used in the analysis. 
  
2.2.3    Congruent validity 
To assess whether all these indicators measure the same thing, inter-correlations were computed. 
This was done separately for rich and poor nations. Only for the rich nations do we have 
complete data. See Scheme I. 
 The correlation between the two legal indicators (nr 1 and 2) is modest: r = +0.46. Both 
correlate better with the financial indicators than with each other. Intercorrelations among the 
financial indicators are consistently sizeable, with the exception of government consumption (nr 
9). The highest correlations are produced by the ILO-index of social security expenditures (nr 5). 
Fortunately that indicator is also available for most poor countries. 
 
 
 
We will first compare across nations to assess whether nations that provide most state-welfare 
tend to be the most livable ones. For that purpose we will first compute zero-order correlations 
between the various indicators of state-welfare effort and our indicators of livability. If positive 
2.3     Analysis 
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correlations emerge, we will inspect to what extend 
these can be attributed to parallel differences in economic affluence. Three methods are used to 
that end: separate analyses among rich and poor nations, computing partial correlations and 
analysis of residuals. 
 Next we compare through time to assess whether livability increased more in the nations 
where state-welfare expanded most. Again the possible effects of parallel changes in economic 
development are controlled. 
 
3          RESULTS 
Below we will first consider the effect of state-welfare on average appreciation-of-life; first by 
comparing across nations and next by comparing through time. This analysis limits to 27 nations, 
of which 19 rich ones. Data on average life-satisfaction in nations are limited as yet. 
 Subsequently, we will consider the effect of state-welfare on length-of-life; again first cross 
nationally and next cross temporally. For this purpose we have data on 97 nations. 
 
 
3.1      State-Welfare and Appreciation-of-Life 
 
3.1.1   Comparison across nations 
Scheme II presents the correlations between state-welfare-effort and subjective satisfaction with 
life. The correlations are based on somewhat different nation sets. 
 When all nations are considered together, a positive zero-order relationship appears. See Scheme 
II left column. The average correlation is about +0.35. Three correlations reach the level of 
statistical significance. The pattern is similar across indicators of state-welfare-effort; legal 
indicators correlate equally well as financial indicators. The two cases where no correlation 
appears (welfare indicator 2 and 3) are based on small samples of largely rich nations. 
 Correlations tell only half the story. Analysis of the scattergrams revealsa non-linear 
relationship. See Scheme 8. The correlation is caused by the difference in happiness between 
countries that provide little or no state-welfare. There is no difference in average happiness 
between the nations that provide little or much state-welfare. 
The cases in the slanting part of the curve are all poor nations; the cases in the horizontal part are 
the rich nations. 
 The convex pattern may mean two things. It may mean that state welfare is subject to the law 
of diminishing utility. In other words: that a minimum of state-welfare is required to create a 
livable society, but that extra state-welfare above that level does not yield greater livability. The 
turning point is then at about 10% of the national income spend for state-welfare. The other 
possibility is that the relationship is spurious, and in fact reflects parallel differences in economic 
development. The same convex pattern emerges if we cross life-satisfaction with economic 
prosperity of the country. Average life-satisfaction is even more closely related to income per 
head (r = +0.70) than to state-welfare-effort. 
 To check this latter possibility we first considered rich and poor nations separately (income 
per capita >$4500 or <=). This changed the picture drastically. In the set of 20 rich nations, no 
relationship remains. Among the 8 poor countries little relationship is left either (data not 
shown). We next computed partial correlations. See Scheme II, second column. None of these 
partial correlations differs significantly from zero. 
 This analysis is visualized in the plot of residuals in scheme 9. In that scattergram the quarter 
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left-under depicts the nations where the state provides less welfare than usual at their level of 
economic prosperity, and where citizens are also less happy than predicted on the basis of 
economic prosperity. The USA is the most prominent case in this quarter. In the quarter 
right-above are the countries where the state provides more welfare than usual at that level of 
economic prosperity, and where citizens are disproportionally happy. Prominent cases in this 
quarter are Ireland (IRL) and Sweden (S). So far the observations are in line with the theory that 
an active welfare-state creates a more livable society. However, this is not the general pattern. 
There is no concentration in the quarter left-under and right above. We see also countries in the 
quarter left above, that combine relatively low state-welfare with relatively high happiness. 
Singapore (SGP) and Switzerland (CH) are the most clear cases here. Likewise, we also find 
countries in the quarter right under; the combination of relatively much state-welfare with 
relatively low happiness. France (F) is the typical case here. Together these 28 cases do not 
reveal any dominant pattern. The correlation of residuals is hence low, and not significantly 
different from zero (r=+0.13 ns). 
 Next to this pattern of correlation with `life-satisfaction' we also considered correlations with 
average report of `happiness' in nations. The results are almost identical. (Schemes not shown.) 
 
 
3.1.2    Comparison through time 
This non-difference does not prove that state-welfare does not make happier. It is possible that 
Father State was more welcome in the initially most unhappy countries, and that differences in 
happiness would have been greater without. In order to grasp causality we must also consider 
change through time. Therefore we inspected whether countries in which state-welfare expanded 
most show a relative increase in life-satisfaction.  
 During the last decades state-welfare expanded in all rich nations. Of only a few of these do 
we have data on the development of life-satisfaction. See Scheme III. The data show little advance 
in life-satisfaction at all, nor systematic difference between slow and fast welfare-expanders. 
There is a tendency to lagging of life-satisfaction in the nations where state-welfare expanded 
most. However, the number of nations is too small to allow definite conclusions. 
 
 
 
Data are more abundant in this case. Of 97 countries we know both the degree of state-welfare 
around 1980 and life-expentancy at that time. Of 37 nations we also have data on changes in both 
variables over the last decades. 
 
3.2.1   Comparison across nations 
Zero-order correlations between indicators of state-welfare and life-expectancy differ markedly. 
See Scheme IV, left column. Three correlations are positive, of which two significant, the other six 
correlations are negative, all insignificant. The differences are probably due to variation in 
nation-sets. The significantly positive correlations appear in the most sizable nation-sets, in 
which a large number of poor nations are involved. See respectively row 1 and row 5 in Scheme 
IV. 
 For three indicators (2, 3, and 4) the nationset is the same as in the analysis of 
satisfaction-with-life (Scheme II). The correlations are highly similar in these cases. 
3.2      State-welfare and length-of-life 
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 Again the scattergrams show a convex pattern; among the poor nations at the left of the scheme 
a steeply ascending slope, and the rich nations at the right on an almost horizontal line. Scheme 10 
presents the plot of indicator 5 (welfare expenditures ILO) against life-expectancy. 
 
Once again, we considered whether the relationship is the spurious effect of parallel differences 
in economic development of these countries. To that end we first computed correlations for poor 
and rich nations separately. This time, the pattern is different among rich and poor nations. 
Among rich nations there is again no correlation between state-welfare and life-expectancy. 
However, among the poor nations significant positive correlations emerge (data not shown). 
 Among the poor nations considered here, there are still sizable difference in economic 
development. The correlations can therefore still be artefactual. Therefore we also computed 
partial correlations. See Scheme IV right column. Now all correlations are reduced to 
insignificance. Separate partial analysis of the poor nations yields the same results (data not 
shown). Even among the poor nations there is no independent 
relationship between state-welfare-effort and life-expectancy. 
 This pattern is visualized in the plot of residuals of Scheme 11. If there had been an independent 
effect of state-welfare on livability, this would have manifested in concentrations in the quarters 
left-under the right above. Life-expectancy would have been lower than usual at their level of 
economic prosperity in the nations that provide less state-welfare than usual at that level (left 
under), and higher than predicted by economic prosperity in the nations that provide more 
state-welfare than usual at that level of living. However, no such pattern appears. In fact there is 
in the quarter left under only one clear case. This is Kuwait, which is in fact positioned outside 
the range shown here. The welfare score of that country is dubious however.2 The USA is also in 
the quarter left below, but pretty close to the middle of the entire pattern. There are more cases in 
the quarter right above. For example in Ireland (IRL) both state-welfare and life-expectancy are 
greater than usual at that level of economic prosperity. However, there are also combinations of 
relatively low state-welfare and high livability. See for instance Malaysia (MAL) and Venezuela 
(YV) in the quarter left above. 
 Scheme 11a presents the poor nations separately. A vertical oval pattern emerges. The dispersion 
on the vertical axis indicates great differences in life-expectancy among these countries, 
irrespective of economic development. The concentration at the horizontal axis means that there 
is little independent variation in state-welfare-effort among the poor countries.3 The direction of 
the midline through the oval (vertically top-down rather than sloping from left under to right 
above) indicates that the large differences in life-expectancy have little relationship with the 
small differences in state-welfare-effort. Apparently, affluence-independent-differences in 
life-expectancy depend on other things than state-welfare-effort. Possibly the differences in 
life-expectancy are due to cultural variation in health behavior or racial variation in wiriness. 
 Scheme 11b presents the rich nations separately. Now a horizontal oval appears, indicating small 
economy-independent differences in life-expectancy, but sizable independent differences in 
state-welfare-effort. In the left of that oval are Australia (AUS), Canada (CND) and the USA. In 
the right of the oval are the nations of North-West Europe. This time, the small differences in 
life-expectancy bear no relationship to the big differences in state-welfare. In this scheme we see 
the two contrasting cases that are often mentioned by advocates of the welfare state: the USA 
that would provide relatively low state-welfare and pay the price of lagging life-expectancy, 
while in Sweden (S) the extended welfare state would prove it effectiveness by a 
disproportionally higher life-expectancy. As we can see, there is indeed a difference of that kind. 
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However, these cases are again not representative of the general pattern. 
 
 
3.2.2    Comparison through time 
During the last decades, state-welfare effort has expanded in most of the nations considered here. 
In the same period average life-expectancy has increased considerably as well. The question is 
now whether the gain in years was greater in the countries where state-welfare expanded most, 
and whether this effect is independent of variation in economic growth. 
 Scheme V presents correlations. All the zero-order correlations are negative, which means that 
life-expectancy increased most in the nations where state-welfare expanded least. This pattern is 
reproduced when rich and poor nations are considered separately (data not shown). The partial 
correlations are also negative. See again Scheme V. 
 Does this mean that expansion of state-welfare tends to reduce life-expectancy rather than 
improve it? Not necessarily. This result can be artefactual. In the nations considered here, 
life-expectancy was not the same initially. These differences matter; the higher average 
life-expectancy is at start, the more difficult it is to gain extra years. Therefore, the data are now 
presented by degree of life-expectancy before expansion of state-welfare. See Schemes VIa and 
VIb. 
 Scheme VIa presents data on 36 nations over a 20 year period. This nation set contains poor 
nations as well as rich nations. In three of these nations state-welfare-effort decreased more than 
2% in this period (Italy, Guyana and Venezuela). In nine cases state-welfare-effort remained at 
about the same level (e.g. Bolivia and Australia). In most of the countries considered here 
state-welfare-effort increased (most rich nations, Costa Rica, Panama and Turkey). We can now 
inspect whether less years of life were won in countries where state-welfare diminished than in 
the countries where it increased. This appears not to be the case. Of the eight countries that had a 
low life-expectancy at start (top row in Scheme VIa), six maintained the same level of state-welfare 
during this period (middle cell), while in two countries state-welfare expenditures increased 
(Panama and Turkey). The gain in life-expectancy in the latter two countries is impressive (12 
years). However, the gain in life-expectancy is even higher in some of the countries where 
state-welfare did not increased (Chili and Togo). 
 Of the eleven countries that had a medium level of life-expectancy at start the gains in 
life-expectancy are considerable as well. See the middle row in Scheme VIa. Now there are also 
two cases where state-welfare-expenditures decreased (Guyana and Venezuela). The average 
gain in life-expectancy in these two nations (7,7 years) is not below the average gain in the two 
countries where welfare-expenditures remained at the same level (7,8 years) or the average gain 
in the seven countries where state-welfare-expenditures increased (7,1 years). Though the 
highest gain is achieved in one of the countries where state-welfare increased (Costa Rica, 11,3 
years), cases of low gain figure in this category as well (Greece and Luxembourg, both 5,2 
years). 
 Of the 17 nations that had a high life-expectancy at start (bottom row in Scheme VIa), only on 
reduced state-welfare in this period (Italy) and only one maintained the same level (Australia). 
The gains in life-expectancy in these countries (4,7 respectively 4,8 years) do not stay behind the 
gains in all other countries, where state-welfare increased. The average gain in these latter 
countries is 3,1 years. 
  
In Scheme VIa most of the rich countries are lumped together in the cell right under. The Scheme
Ruut Veenhoven & Piet Ouweneel 11 Livability of the welfare-state
  
 
 
does not show the considerable difference in growth of welfare-expenditures among these 
countries. Therefore the rich countries are also presented separately in Scheme VIb. Scheme VIb not 
only specifies growth in state-welfare, but it also considers gains in life-expectancy on a finer 
scale. The data concern a longer period; now 30 years.4 
 These data do not show greater gains in life-expectancy in countries where state-welfare 
expanded most either. In fact, there is rather a tendency to the contrary. Among the rich countries 
that started at the lowest life-expectancy, the one that raised welfare expenditures least realized 
the greatest gain in life-expectancy (Japan), whereas the gain was lowest in the two countries that 
expanded welfare most (Belgium, Ireland). Likewise, among the nations that started at the 
medium level, the modest expanders won most years (Australia, Canada). At the highest level 
the same pattern appears: more years won in the case where state-welfare increased least 
(Greece). In fact only a few cases fit the prediction of greater gains by the greatest expanders: at 
the medium level respectively New Zealand, Britain and France. 
  
As a final check we computed the partial correlation between growth of welfare-expenditures 
and increase in life-expectancy, controlling for life-expectancy at start; (rp=-0.08 (ns). 
 
 
4           DISCUSSION 
The results are summarized in the exhibit below (scheme 7). Clearly, there is no relationship 
between the amount of state-welfare in the country and its apparent livability. There is not even 
evidence that a minimum level of state-welfare is required.  
 The findings are disturbing for both parties in the discussion. Though welfare-states do not 
show superior livability, they do not perform worse either. Disappointment in the results usually 
makes validity doubts more pressing. Therefore we will first consider the possibility that the 
observations are not adequate. Next we will explore some possible substantive explanations. In 
connection some policy implication will be mentioned. We will close with the enumeration of 
some themes for further research. 
 
 
4.1       Validity of the results 
 
4.1.1    Validity of indicators 
One reason to doubt the results could be that the measures may be inadequate. There can be 
problems in the indicators of state-welfare-effort as well as the two measures of livability. 
 
Indicators of state-welfare effort Each for themselves these indicators have their limitations; 
remember page 5-7 and the discussion on their applicability to the rich Gulf-states. Still, the 
inter-correlations of these indicators showed high congruent validity (Scheme I). Also, the 
correlations with indicators of livability are highly similar. Remember the Schemes II and IV. 
There is thus little reason to expect that other indicators of state-welfare will produce different 
results. 
 
Indicators of Livability  There is little reason to doubt the data on life-expectancy; vital statistics 
may be inaccurate in some countries, but systematic distortion is unlikely to be involved. There 
is more doubt about the quality of our data on life-satisfaction. These survey data may involve 
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differential sampling error; for instance under-representation of the homeless. Cross national 
comparability may also be hampered by cultural variation in response bias. Elsewhere, these 
possibilities have been considered in detail. Validity checks showed little distortion in responses 
to questions about happiness (Veenhoven, 1984, 1993). Moreover, this study showed that `soft' 
life-satisfaction relates identically to economic prosperity and state welfare as `hard' 
life-expectancy.  
 
 
4.1.2     Period too short? 
Still one could argue that life-expectancy and life-satisfaction are not appropriate as measures of 
current livability of nations, because these outcomes could depend very much on past conditions. 
Life-expectancy could depend very much on health-habits of earlier generations and on nutrition 
in the first years of life. Life-satisfaction in a country could be geared by traditional outlook on 
life. As a result these indicators would react with considerable delay. This argument presumes 
that life-expectancy and life-satisfaction are rather fixed and adjust at best very slowly. 
 This appears not to be to case. Considerable changes have been observed in period less than a 
decade with rather evident immediate causes. For instance, life-expectancy gained 11.6 years in 
Japan between 1950 and 1980, largely as a result of improvements in medical care and standard 
of living. Likewise, life-satisfaction rose considerably in the post-war decade in the West 
European nations that had suffered occupation or defeat. Elsewhere Veenhoven (1994) has 
shown in more detail that average life-satisfaction is sensitive to current quality-of-life. 
 Another reason to doubt that findings could be that positive effects of state-welfare show up 
quickly, but that its negative effects manifest only in the long run. For example, the believed 
negative effect on work ethics could present not until one or two generations later. This would 
imply that the non-difference observed now will turn into a negative effect later. 
 In this context it is worth remembering that our first indicator of state-welfare effort measures 
in fact the lifetime of the system. This is Estes' `Welfare Index', which is based on the year of 
adoption of first welfare laws. As such it dates back to the beginning of this century. Delayed 
deterioration should appear in lower livability of the eldest welfare-states. As we have seen this 
is not the case. The senior welfare states Britain and Germany do not stand out as less livable. 
 
 
4.1.3    Control for economic prosperity too severe? 
Some zero-order correlations suggest that welfare states are more livable, but after control for 
economic prosperity of the countries involved, all correlations were reduced to insignificance. 
Does that mean that the greater livability of the welfare-states is caused by their wealth rather 
than by their state-care? That inference is correct if expansion state-welfare depends entirely on 
economic development. It certainly 
does to a great extend, but does it entirely? There are good reasons to assume that state-welfare 
not only burdens the economy, but stimulates it in several ways as well: e.g. by its anti-cyclical 
effects.6 If so, the control for income per head also removed true effects of state-welfare. 
 We do not know to what extend state-welfare boosts the economy, but suppose we would. 
Suppose that some 25% of the shared variance of economic prosperity and state-welfare is due to 
effects of the latter on the former. Would that change the picture? Not where the rich nations are 
concerned. Among these, there is no significant zero-order correlation between state-welfare-effort 
 and livability, and neither a correlation with economic wealth. So control for 
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economic prosperity could not change that picture. However, among the poor nations all these 
variables are sizably correlated. In this case, the control for prosperity can have obscured an 
effect of state-welfare. If so, state-welfare would add somewhat to livability in poor nations, but 
not in rich ones. 
 
 
4.2       Substantial Explanations 
 
Suppose that there is really no difference in livability between nations that provide much or little 
state-welfare. That phenomenon can then be explained in two ways: One explanation could be 
that we can live well without welfare. The other explanation is that we need welfare, but not 
necessarily state-welfare, because other welfaresuppliers perform equally well.  
 
4.2.1     Need for welfare-services 
What we call `welfare' is largely income supplementation in cases of illness, disability and old 
age. Welfare-systems are mutual arrangements for income transfer from the lucky to the unlucky, 
that guarantee a minimum level of living for everybody. All human societies involve welfare 
systems, mostly in moral obligations to help relatives. It is rather evident that life-expectancy would 
 be considerably lower if there was no welfare at all. A lot of people would starve. 
That prospect would result in lower satisfaction-with-life as well. So, the observed non-difference 
cannot mean that welfare does not matter to livability at all.  
 Though no society is livable without any welfare-services, societies that provide most welfare 
are not necessarily the most livable. Like most services, welfare is probably subject to the law of 
diminishing returns. Seen in this light the observed non-difference can mean that most present 
day societies provide the required minimum. 
 Welfare provision above the minimum may also surpass a maximum and then reduce 
livability; for instance when care becomes smothering and the price soars. If so, we should see a 
negative trend among the most developed welfare states. There are indeed indications of that 
kind, in the negative correlations in Scheme III and V. On the other hand cross-sections show no 
negative pattern among rich nations. See Scheme II and IV. For the time being, there is no 
convincing evidence of welfare-surfeit. 
 
 
4.2.2   Welfare providers 
We have considered it state-welfare-effort in nations; not total welfare-effort. In all nations 
non-state corporations provide welfare-services as well: commercial insurance companies, firms 
who pay part of the wages in social security entitlement, charity organizations and families. In 
the rich countries these non-state services typically supplement a minimum guaranteed by the 
state. In most poor nations the family is the main provider. 
 In this light, the observed non-difference could mean that the state is no better welfare 
provider than non-state institutions. In other words, that non-state welfare tends to be 
`functionally equivalent'. No doubt, all systems of welfare provision have specific advantages 
and disadvantages, but apparently the balance tends to be about the same. 
 If so, that does not mean that state-welfare has never been superior or will never be. The 
comparative effectiveness of welfare supply systems is likely to be contingent on welfare 
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services concerned and on the socio-political conditions in which these are produced. Possibly, 
state-welfare was superior for the provision for old age care in era of dissolving family ties and 
unexpected lengthening of life. Also Zapf (1994) is probably right in that individualisation in 
modern societies renders state-welfare indispensable. In fact, state-welfare exists in all developed 
societies. Even in the USA social security expenditures take more than 10% of the national 
income. 
 Still, the data suggest that even in rich nations a considerable share of welfare services can 
currently as well be provided by non-state institutions. Yet this does not mean that we can reduce 
state-care without harming livability at least contemporarily. Non-state welfare provision has 
atropined in the welfare-states, hence cut in welfare can leave citizens without equivalent 
alternative. 
 
 
4.3        Implications for the Discussion on the Welfare-State 
 
In the rich nations the welfare-state as such is hardly questioned. The current controversy is 
about the share of the state in the welfare provision. Conservatives tend to plea for a modest 
share, such as in the USA. Progressive mostly prefer a big share, such as in Sweden. 
 The results of this study show that these differences are largely irrelevant for the total 
livability of the country. Apparently the balance of positive and negative effects is equal for both 
options; at least in rich nations. Therefore, the discussion cannot be decided on the livability 
criterion. 
 Still, a choice must be made about the size of the welfare-state. That choice must now be 
based on other criteria than livability. Conservatives will stress `economic competitiveness' and 
progressives `social justice'. There is nothing wrong with that, but we must realize that the aim is 
then on competitiveness and justice for itself, not competitiveness and justice for the sake of 
livability. We must still make a choice, but what we choose is less relevant. 
 In the poor nations the discussion is rather about some state-welfare or none at all. The data 
are less clear in this case, both because the observations are more limited and because the control 
for economic prosperity may have been too severe. Still, we must count with the possibility that 
developing nations can be equally livable without any state-welfare. 
 
 
4.4      Issues for Further Research 
 
Effect in poor nations 
It is still possible that some state-welfare (rather than non at all) does add to livability in poor 
nations. The range of indicators considered is small in this case. In fact we had a only a sufficient 
number of cases for one indicator of livability (life-expectancy) and one indicator of 
state-welfare-effort (ILO index of expenditures). Moreover, 
the control for economic prosperity may have been too severe. 
 The problem of limited indicators is solvable in principle, though not easy in practice. 
Probably the indicators used for rich nations will become available for a sizable number of poor 
nations as well. The task is then to try again. 
     The problem of distinguishing between effects of economic prosperity and state-welfare can hardly
be solved however, unless statisticians find out new methods for dealing with multi-collinearity.   
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Contingencies 
As noted above, the effect of state-welfare effort on livability may be contingent on situations. In 
that context it is worth noting that the data used here concern an era of relative smooth economic 
development and political stability. Possibly, state-welfare has an edge over its alternatives in 
times of turmoil. Such contingencies can be identified by comparing effects in different decades 
or by considering contrasting groups of nations. 
 
Separate welfare services? 
We have considered total state-welfare-effort. Policy makers are mostly more interested in the 
relative performance of the state in the production of separate welfare services; decisions are 
made on specific services, total welfare-effort is typically the unintended sum of such piecemeal 
decisions. The issue is certainly not irrelevant; states may do relatively good in the provision of 
old age pensions, and commercial insurance companies may perform better in the financing of 
health care. Though not easy, it is possible to estimate the degree of state-involvement in the 
production of specific welfare services in countries. The problem is rather in the output criterion. 
The differences at hand hare are probably too small to affect total livability of the country. 
 
Dispersion of happiness and health 
We have measured the livability of nations by the degree to which citizens live long and happily. 
For that purpose we considered the average level of life-satisfaction and life-expectancy. We did 
not consider dispersion around that level. 
 Though state involvement in the provision of welfare may not add to the level of livability of 
the country, it may still generate more equality in quality of life. In the typical welfare-states 
citizens may be about equally happy and healthy, whereas in other states great differences in 
well-being exist. If so, that would plea for high state involvement; now not for the sake of 
livability, but for the sake of equality. 
 For this purpose we have also examined the dispersion in appreciation-of-life and in 
length-of-life in nations. At first sight there is no difference in that respect either (Veenhoven, 
1992; Veenhoven and Ouweneel, in preparation). 
 
 
 
5         CONCLUSION 
The welfare-state does not appear as a more livable society. This is clearly so for rich nations, 
among which much (rather than modest) state-welfare does not materialize in a longer or happier 
life of the average citizen. Probably the same is true for poor nations, among which little (rather 
than none) state-welfare does not seem to add to average length of life either. 
 Though there is no evidence for a positive effect of state-welfare, there is no evidence for a 
negative effect either. So neither the proponents of the welfare-state, nor its critics can claim 
victory. 
 Because the amount of state-welfare does not affect the livability of the country, the choice for 
much or modest welfare can be based on other grounds. 
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NOTES 
 
1 For a review of the discussion on the welfare state see i.a. Chelf (1992), Mishra (1984), Murray (1984), Off (1984), 
Wilding (1986), Ringen  (1987) and Zapf (1994). The criterion of livability is mostly implicit in the discussion. 
 
2 There is one outline not shown in Scheme 11. That is the case of Kuwait. Kuwait provided abundant state-welfare in the 
1980's. Because Kuwait was immensely rich at that time, its welfare-expenditures were nevertheless low relative to the 
national income. Hence Kuwait scores low on the ILO index. The exceptional wealth of Kuwait distorts the analysis in 
another way as well; life-expectancy in Kuwait is low relative to its wealth. As a result Kuwait figures in isolation left 
under in Scheme 11, and produces a positive correlation of residuals (r=+0.31; p< 0.05). The case of Bahrein is similar. 
Therefore these two Gulf-states are left out. 
 
3 This oval pattern of residuals is at least partly produced by the method of analysis used here. Residuals are deviations 
from a linear regression line. The relationship between life-expectancy and economic prosperity is non-linear however. It 
follows a convex curve, typical of a pattern of diminishing utility. The linear regression line cuts this curve at two points, 
before its bend and after. As a result the deviations are greater at the extremes and in the bend. This produces high 
residuals for very poor nations such as Gabon as well as for close-to-rich nations such as Sri Lanka. The relation between 
economic affluence and state-welare is also curved, but less so. Therefore, the pattern of oval rather than round. 
 
4  For the entire nation-set we have only comparable data over a 20 year period. 
 
5 The different indicators of state-welfare-effort produce at least similar non-relations with livability in rich nations. The 
analysis of the poor nations is exclusively based on one financial indicator (the ILO index). 
 
6 Positive effects of state-welfare on economic growth are discussed in more detail in George and Wilding (1984). 
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Scheme 1 
Inter-correlations of indicators of state-welfare-effort 
19 rich nations around 1980 
Indicators of state-welfare-effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Legal indicators          
1. Years since first law  
 (Estes 1984 Welfare index) 
         
2. Coverage 
 (Esping-Andersen's 1990 
 De-commodification score) 
+.46         
Financial indicators          
Social security expenditure          
3. OECD +.61 +.55        
4. modified OECD  
 (Gordon 1986) 
+.66 +.75 +.78       
5. ILO (1988) +.73 +.74 +.83 +.97      
6. IMF (1986) +.63 +.71 +.80 +.90 +.93     
Government expenditures          
7. all, per capita +.54 +.65 +.61 +.87 +.85 +.72    
8. disbursements % GDP +.67 +.69 +.70 +.94 +.94 +.82 +.89 +.73  
9. consumption % GDP +.43 +.42 +.18 +.70 +.64 +.55 +.66 +.25 +.79 
 
Data: Appendix 1         
Fat printed correlations: p<.05 
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Scheme 2 
Satisfaction-with-life and state-welfare-effort 
27 nations around 1980 
Indicators  of state-welfare-effort  Correlation with average 
 satisfaction-with-life 
 N 
 
Nations 
  zero-order 
 correlation 
 income per head 
partialed out 
  
legal indicators     
1. Years since first law  r=+.55 (01)  rp=+.23 (ns)  27 OECD nations, Brazil, India, Mexico, Korea, 
Phillipines, Singapore, South Africa,  
2. Coverage  r=+.25 (ns) 
 
 rp=+.24 (ns)  17 OECD nations only 
financial indicators      
Social security expenditures in % or GDP     
3. OECD  r=-.09 (ns)  rp=-.23 (ns)  22 OECD nations only 
4. modified OECD  r=+.30 (ns)  rp=+.26 (ns)  18 OECD nations only 
5. ILO  r=+.50 (01)  rp=+.13 (ns)  26 OECD nations, Brazil, India, Mexico, Korea, 
Phillipines, Singapore, South Africa 
6. IMF  r=+.42 (01)   rp=+.04 (ns)  27 OECD nations, Brazil, India, Mexico, Korea, 
Phillipines, Singapore, South Africa 
Government expenditures     
7. all, per capita  r=+.30 (ns)   rp=+.27 (ns)  19 OECD nations only 
8. disbursements % GDP  r=+.22 (ns)  rp=+.14 (ns)  22 OECD nations only 
9. consumption % GDP  r=+.43 (ns)  rp=+.37 (ns)  22 OECD nations only 
 
   Data: Appendix 1 
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Scheme 3 
Growth in state-welfare-effort and change in average satisfaction-with-life 
10 nations over three decades 
Indicators of change in state-welfare-effort  Correlation (zero-order) with 
 change in appreciation of life 
 (in the same period)  
 N Nations 
 
5. Growth welfare-expenditures (ILO)  
 1975-1985 
 
  
 r=-. 18 (ns) 
  
 13 
 
EC (9), Australia, 
Canada, Japan, 
USA 
 
 
9. Growth government expenditures 
    (final consumption) 
 1950-1985 
 
 r=-.60 (ns)  9 OECD (8), 
Mexico 
 
Data: Appendix 1 
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Scheme 4 
State-welfare-effort and average length-of-life 
103 nations around 1980 
Indicators  of state-welfare-effort Correlation with life-expectancy  N Nations 
  zero-order 
 correlation 
 income per head 
partialled out 
  
legal indicators     
1. Years since first law  r=+.70 (01)  rp=+.05 (ns)  93 23 rich nations 
70 poor nations 
2. Coverage  r=+.27 (ns)  rp=+.25 (ns)  17 OECD nations only 
financial indicators      
Social security expenditures in % or GDP     
3. OECD  r=-.24 (ns)  rp=_.29 (ns)  22 OECD nations only 
4. modified OECD  r=-.09 (ns)  rp=-.12 (ns)  18 OECD nations only 
5. ILO  r=+.66 (01)  rp=+.13 (ns)  87 26 rich nations 
61 poor nations 
6. IMF  r=-.08 (ns)  rp=-.11 (ns)  18 rich nations only 
Government expenditures     
7. all, per capita  r=-.05 (ns)  rp=-.10 (ns)  19 OECD nations only 
8. disbursements % GDP  r=-.20 (ns)  rp=-.29 (ns)  19 OECD nations only 
9. consumption % GDP  r=-.13 (ns)  rp=-.24 (ns)  19 OECD nations only 
 
            Data: Appendix 1  poor/rich treshold:$4500 per head  
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Scheme 5 
Change in state-welfare-effort and change in average length-of-life 
37 nations 1965-1985 
Indicators of change in state-welfare-effort Correlation with gain in life-expec-
tancy the same period  
 N Nations 
  zero-order 
 correlation 
 growth GDP 
 controlled 
  
 
5. Growth welfare-expenditures (ILO)  
 
 
 - 1965-1985 
 
 
 
 - 1975-1985 
  
 
 
 
 
 r=-.52 (01) 
 
 
 
 r=-.49 (01) 
 
 
 
 
 n.a. 
 
 
 
 rp=-.29 (ns) 
 
 
 
 
 37 
 
 
 
 29 
 
 
 
 
22 rich nations 
15 poor nations 
 
 
22 rich nations 
7  poor nations 
 
 
Growth in welfare expenditures per head in constant dollars (computed from ILO and Borenstein 1993) 
Growth GDP also in constant dollars per head (Data Borenstein 1993) 
Poor/rich threshold $4500 per head 
 
 
Ruut Veenhoven & Piet Ouweneel 25 Livability of the welfare-state
  
 
 
Scheme 6a 
Change in state-welfare expenditures and gains in life-expectancy by life-expectancy at start 
36 nations (rich and poor) 1965-1985 
 
life-expectancy in years 1965  gains in life-expectancy in years 1965-1985 
  change social security expenditures 1965-1985 as a % of GDP (ILO) 
 decrease of expenditures (≤- 2%) stable expenditures (-2 to +2%) rise of expenditures  (+ >2%) 
low: less than 60 years   9.0    Bolivia 
13.9   Chili 
12.3   Colombia 
-1.2   El Salvador 
 8.3   Guatemala 
17.9  Togo 
12.8  Panama 
12.3  Turkey 
middle: 61 to 70 years  8.8  Guyana  
 6.6  Venezuela 
 9.4   Jamaica 
 5.1   Trinidad 
 7.3  Austria 
11.3  Costa Rica 
 6.6  Cyprus 
 5.6  Finland 
 5.2  Greece 
 5.2  Luxembourg 
 8.3  Portugal 
high: 70 years or more  4.7  Italy  4.8   Australia                                         2.8  Belgium 
 4.4  Canada   
 2.2  Denmark 
 4.6  France 
 4.6  Germany 
 2.2  Ireland 
 3.0  Israel 
 8.1  Japan 
 2.8  Netherlands 
 3.0  New Zealand 
 2.2  Norway 
 3.5  Sweden 
 5.2  Switzerland  
 
 
 
 3.4  United Kingdom 
 4.5  USA 
Data: Appendix 1 
Ruut Veenhoven & Piet Ouweneel 26 Livability of the welfare-state
  
 
 
Scheme 6b 
Growth in state-welfare-expenditures and gains in life-expectancy by life-expectancy at start 
19 rich nations 1950-1980 
life-expectancy in years 1950  gains in life-expectancy in years 1960-1980 
  growth social security expenditures 1950-1980 in % GDP (ILO) 
 low increase: < + 5% middle increase: 5 to 10% high increase: > +10% 
low: 69-70 years 11.6 Japan                                                    5.1 Austria 
7.5       Finland 
5.7       Germany (W) 
7.1        Italy 
5.8        USA 
4.8      Belgium 
4.2      Ireland 
middle: 71 years 5.9 Austria
6.1        Canada 
3.5        New Zealand 
4.8         Britain                                                                                      5.8       France 
high: 72-74 years 5.1        Greece                                                                                                                                                                                                              2.9       Denmark 
3.4       Netherlands 
3.6      Norway 
4.1      Sweden 
 
 
Data: Appendix 1 
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Scheme 7 
 
Summary of results 
 
 
Indicators of livability  
of nations 
 
  
 Relationship with state-welfare-effort 
 
  Greater in nations 
 where state provides 
  most welfare? 
 More increased 
 in the nations where  
 state-welfare expanded most? 
 
Average satisfaction-with-life 
 
  
 NO 
  
 NO 
 
Average length-of-life 
 
  
 NO 
  
 NO 
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   Scheme 8  
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Scattergram of 26 nations in 1980 (r=+.50, p<.01) Nation codes:Appendix 2 
Welfare-expenditures and appreciation-of-life
  Scheme 9  
 Welfare-expenditures and life-satisfaction. Effects of income per head on both variables remove
 Plot of residuals of 27 nations in 1980 (r=+.13, ns). Nation codes:Appendix 2 
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                                  Scheme 10
   Welfare-expenditures and length-of-life
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      Scattergram of 97 nations in 1980 (r=+.67, p<.01). Nation codes:Appendix 2 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Scheme 11  
 Welfare-expenditures and length-of-life. Effects of income-per-head on both variables removed.
 
    Plot of residuals of 88 nations in 1980 (r=+.13, ns). Nation codes:Appendix 2 
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Appendix 2 
 
Nation codes used in plots 
 
Nation  Code Nation  Code Code Nation  Code Nation 
 
Albania  AL Kuwait  KWT A Austria  LB Liberia 
Algeria  DZ Lebanon  RL ADN Yemen  M Malta 
Antigua  ANT Liberia  LB AL Albania  MA Morocco 
Argentina                             RA Libya  LAR ANT Antigua  MAL Malaysia 
Australia  AUS Luxemburg   L AUS Australia  MEX Mexico 
Austria  A Madagascar  RM B Belgium  MS Mauritius 
Burk.Fasso  BF Malawi  MW BD Bangladesh MW Malawi 
Bahamas  BS Malaysia  MAL BDS Barbados  N Norway 
Bahrain  BRN Mali  RMM BF Burkina Fasso NEP Nepal 
Bangladesh  BD Malta  M BG Bulgaria  NIC Nicaragua 
Barbados  BDS Mauretania  RIM BH Belize  NL Netherlands 
Belgium  B Mauritius                   MS BR Brazil  NZ New Zealand 
Belize  BH Mexico  MEX BRN Bahrain  P Portugal 
Benin  DY Morocco  MA BS Bahamas  PA Panama 
Bolivia  RB N.Zealand   NZ BU Burma  PE Peru 
Brazil  BR Nepal  NEP C Cuba  PK Pakistan 
Bulgaria  BG Netherlands NL CAM Cameroon           PL Poland 
Burma  BU Nicaragua                                   NIC CDN Canada  PY Paraguay 
Burundi  RU Niger  RN CH Switzerland RA Argentina 
Central Africa RCA Nigeria  WAN CHA Chad  RB Bolivia 
Costa Rica                                      CR Norway  N CI Ivory Coast RCA Central Africa 
Cameroon    CAM Pakistan  PK CL Sri Lanka  RCB Congo 
Canada  CDN Panama  PA CO Colombia  RCH Chile 
Chad  CHA Paraguay  PY CR Costa Rica RH Haiti 
Chile  RCH Peru  PE CS Czecho-Slovakia RI Indonesia 
Colombia  CO Philippines                              RP CY Cyprus RIM Mauretania 
Congo  RCB Poland  PL D Germany  RK South Korea 
Cuba  C Portugal  P DK Denmark  RL Lebanon 
Cyprus  CY Rumania  RO DOM Dominican Rep. RM Madagascar 
Czechoslovakia CS Rwanda  RWA DY Benin  RMM Mali 
Denmark  DK S.Africa  ZA DZ Algeria  RN Niger 
Dominican Rep.  DOM S.Korea  ROK E Spain  RO Rumania 
Ecuador  EC Sri Lanka  CL EAK Kenya  RP Phillipines 
Egypt  ET Sierra Leone WAL EAT Tanzania  RU Burundi 
El Salvador ES Senegal  SN EAU Uganda  RWA Rwanda 
Ethiopia  ETH Seychelles SY EC Ecuador   S Sweden 
Finland  SF Singapore               SGP ES El Salvador SF Finland 
France  F Somalia  SP ET Egypt  SGP Singapore 
Gabon  GAB Spain  E ETH Ethiopia  SME Surinam 
Germany  D Sudan  SUD F France  SN Senegal 
Ghana  GH Surinam  SME GAB Gabon  SP Somalia 
Greece  GR Sweden  S GCA Guatemala SUD Sudan 
Grenada  WG Switzerland CH GH Ghana  SY Seychelles 
Guatemala   GCA Syria  SYR GN Guinea  SYR Syria 
Guinea  GN Tanzania  EAT GR Greece  T Thailand 
Guyana  GUY Thailand  T GUY Guyana  TG Togo 
Haiti  RH Togo  TG H Hungary  TN Tunesia 
Honduras                          HND Trinidad  TT HKJ Jordan TR Turkey 
Hungary  H Tunisia  TN HND Honduras TT Trinidad-Tobago 
Iceland  IS Turkey  TR I Italy  U Uruguay 
India  IND Uganda  EAU IL Israel  UK United Kingdom 
Indonesia                   RI United Kingdom  UK IND India  USA United States 
Iran IR Urugay U IR Iran  VN Vietnam 
Iraq IRQ USA  USA IRL Ireland  WAL Sierra Leone 
Ireland  IRL Venezuela   YV IRQ Iraq  WAN Nigeria 
Israel  IL Vietnam  VN IS Iceland  WG Grenada 
Italy  I Yemen  ADN J Japan  YU Yugoslavia 
Ivory Coast CI Yugoslavia  YU JA Jamaica  YV Venezuela 
Jamaica  JA Zaire  ZRE K Kampuchea Z Zambia 
Japan  J Zambia  Z KWT Kuwait  ZA South Africa 
Jordan  HKJ Zimbabwe    ZW L Luxembourg ZRE Zaire 
Kampuchea   K    LAR Libya  ZW Zimbabwe 
Kenya                          EAK
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